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Et ex
Arcadia ego N.
Fields (University of Edinburgh) — x — He a
poore mercenary serves for bread Throughout history pastoral economies and areas of mountain and poor
soil, which invariably go together, have been providers of surplus manpower
and thus prime recruiting grounds for large bodies of mercenaries:
Switzerland is a notable example from the early modern period. According to
J.R. Sallares the demographic consequences of mercenary service should not be
underestimated. In the early modern period mortality among Swiss mercenaries
mopped up thirty-five to forty per cent of the natural increase of the
population of the Swiss cantons.1
In one year alone, 1495, despite the formal prohibitions issued by the Diet
of Cantons, 20,000 Swiss — around one fifth of the total male population of
the Confederation — came down the alpine passes looking to enrol as
mercenaries in the French army of Charles VIII, which was then campaigning in
northern Italy.2
Having recently secured the independence of their country from the
Burgundians and the Habsburgs, the Swiss were now poised to hire themselves
out as mercenaries in just about every army in Europe, a trend that was to
continue for the next three hundred years. As the late sixteenth-century
English traveller, Fynes Moryson, noted: Nature
and necessity have framed them [the Swiss] to the warre, for a mountainous
region, and woody ... breedes a rude people, patient of hardnesse, and of
warlike disposition, and as taller trees and larger cattle, so stronger bodies
of man, so as they seem to be borne souldiers.3 Switzerland
was in effect a nation of mercenaries, indeed one whose whole raison
d’être was supplying mercenaries. “Borne souldiers”, mercenary
service for the Swiss was a useful supplement to their frugal way of life.
And so, the factor of poverty gave way to a sense of vocation, example,
tradition and government encouragement. Some bands were pledged by cantons,
which had signed capitulations with foreign rulers, whereas in other cases it
was individual captains who negotiated and recruited. Nevertheless, both
methods were carried out within a framework of arrangements made by the Diet
and mercenary service soon became a source of income for the cantons. Like the Swiss, the Arcadians were tough
mountaineers from an impoverished region, and, like the Swiss, they
constantly served abroad as mercenaries. Lykomedes of Mantineia, the first
leader of the Arcadians after the establishment of the Arcadian League in
369/8 BC, is reputed to have boasted: “When anyone
wants mercenaries, they choose Arcadians second to none” (Xen. Hell.
7.1.23). In the same inaugural speech, Lykomedes also claims that the
Arcadians were the most populous ethnic group in Greece, the strongest
physically, and the bravest of peoples.4 Although his points form the backbone of a political statement,
Lykomedes’ sentiments are echoed across the centuries and their like can be
read in Baedeker’s travelogue entry for the Arcadian town of Dhimitsana: As in many other mountain communities of
Arcadia, its inhabitants have become more numerous than the land can
maintain, and many of them emigrate to Athens or even abroad as traders or
artisans.5 There is,
of course, a subtle difference here: the Arcadian emigrants of Lykomedes’ day
were artisans of war and not cobblers, blacksmiths, carpenters or labourers.
Paradoxically, literary Arcadia is an idyllic, abundant landscape, a place of
nymphs and shepherds, of poetry and music, where love, not survival, is the
dominant concern of its inhabitants. The prime objective of this paper,
therefore, is to explain why Arcadia was the main supplier of Greek
mercenaries during the archaic and classical periods. The
geo-political landscape The
simple mannered delights of “Arcady” are the creation of late and
sophisticated folk seeking to retreat from the pressures and complexities of
urban life, but Arcadia has always been, and still is, a pastoral country.6 Her stock epithet in ancient literature was “of the many sheep” (Il.
*B 605; Hes. Her. 1; To Pan 29; Bacch. 38.94-5; Pind. Ol.
6.100; Theoc. 22.157; Anth. Pal. 73.5), while her people were
traditionally portrayed as “acorn-eaters” (Alc. fr. 54 Edmonds; Hdt. 1.66;
Paus. 8.1.6; 42.6; Artem. 2.25; Philostr. VA 8.7, cf. Od. E
242).7 Likewise, her warriors were seen as wild and uncouth highlanders who
would rush headlong into battle wearing only the skins of wolves, bears or
sheep (Paus. 4.11.3, cf. 8.1.5). Polybios, himself an Arcadian, calls his
fellow countrymen “primitive” (4.21.2), while Strabon, a non-Arcadian,
describes them as “wholly mountaineers” (8.1.2). Although this simplicity of
the Arcadian character was to be idealised by Roman poets, the Arcadians did
not possess an equal reputation for intelligence. Juvenal calls a blockhead
an “Arcadian youth” (7.160), and even as late as the third century AD we
witness Philostratos describing the Arcadians as “the most boorish of men”
who lived in “squalor” (VA 8.7.12). Mountaineers they unquestionably
were, but to characterise the Arcadian as a simple and uncultivated person
was a convenient caricature and should not be taken too seriously. In
reality, the land of the Arcadians is still one of hard beauty, situated as
it is in the elevated centre of the Peloponnese and ringed by an irregular
bulwark of elevated folded-limestone mountains, which, until fairly recently,
were the habitat of numerous bears, wolves, polecats and even jackals. The western and eastern parts of Arcadia
differ considerably in their physical features. In the former the mountains
are wild, lofty and bleak, closely piled upon one another and possessing
valleys that are so deep that even today travel is difficult. Here and there
is an abundance of permanent rivers fed by numerous streams and springs, the
whole region being drained by the Alpheios, the principal river of the
Peloponnese. On all gentle slopes there is good soil cover and the natural
vegetation is comparatively luxuriant: at higher elevations cling fir trees,
while lower down there are deciduous oak to be found. The one exception to
all this ruggedness is the plain of Megalopolis, which lies in the heart of
south-west Arcadia, a moderately hilly basin stretched either side of the
Alpheios. The surface of this plain is diversified with copses and undulating
downs and hillocks, refreshed by numerous streams shaded with plane trees and
oak. Even with the arrival of the Megalopolis power-station complex and the
recent expansion of the modern town, the whole plain is still notable for its
sylvan beauty. In contrast, the Mantiniki dominates the eastern region of
Arcadia, a bare monotonous flat upland plain unrelieved by trees (apart from
cultivated deciduous fruit trees) or rivers enclosed by an amphitheatre of
steep barren mountains.8 Similar, albeit smaller, plains lie to its north, and as a
consequence, almost all the major Arcadian poleis — Tegea, Mantineia,
Orchomenos, Kleitor, Pheneos, Alea and Stymphalos — were situated in this
region. It was this rugged alpine terrain that went a
long way towards preventing any one Arcadian polis from dominating another in
the way, for example, Thebes dominated all Boiotia.
In particular, the Mantiniki and its water supply was usually squabbled over
by two inveterate rivals, the poleis of Tegea and Mantineia (Thuc. 5.65.4,
cf. 4.134.2). Tegea commanded the southern half of this plain and barred the
direct route into Lakonia, while Mantineia — whose existence very much
depended on the maintenance of the neighbouring sink-holes — held sway over
the northern end.9 Further north, Orchomenos, from its acropolis perched high between
two enclosed upland plains, was able to control the surrounding region and
the mountain passes to Corinth. This control, however, could easily be
curtailed if Orchomenos’ more powerful southern neighbour, Mantineia, flexed
its muscles, or if matters went badly for the polis during one of the many
border skirmishes it fought with Kleitor, a rival polis to the north-west
(e.g. Xen. Hell. 5.4.36). Since the Arcadians were not united by any
political league, and rarely acted in concert until the foundation of
Megalopolis in 369/8 BC, their history down to this date is the local history
of their individual poleis and village settlements. If the mountainous character of Arcadia
has never really been favourable to the forming of one central ruling power,
it has also prevented foreign powers from dominating it. The connections of
Arcadia with the outside world were scarce, and somewhat limited to the
eastern and south-western regions only. The natural obstacles that separate
Arcadia from the Isthmus, the Argolid and Lakonia were, until the opening of
the Corinth-Tripolis highway in January 1991, a hindrance to regular and easy
communications. The isolated position of inland Peloponnesian states was
clearly stressed in a speech of the Corinthians to the assembly of the
Peloponnesian League in 432 BC (Thuc. 1.120.2), a point taken up by both
Strabon (8.8.1) and Pausanias (8.1.3) when they specifically mention Arcadia.
Although they bowed to Sparta’s
orders as to the dispositions of their military forces as members of the
Peloponnesian League, the Arcadians maintained their collective independence
and never became Sparta’s obedient allies during the fifth and early fourth
centuries BC. The Mantiniki, Arcadia’s largest plain, was directly linked
with the Eurotas valley through the northern Lakonian hills by at least two
major routes. Other routes out of this upland plain gave access to the
Megalopolis plain to the south-west and thence Messenia, to Hysiai and Argos
to the east, and to Orchomenos to the north. It was desirable, therefore, for
Sparta to have the poleis of Mantineia and Tegea subservient to her
interests. These were the two leading Arcadian states that, unless policed,
could often establish hegemony over the smaller and weaker Arcadian
settlements, which would, in turn, threaten Sparta’s vital domination of the
Peloponnesian League (Thuc. 4.134.1-2; 5.28.3-29.2; 33.1-3; 81.1). Hence the
Mantiniki often became the cockpit in which pro- and anti-Spartan alliances
settled their differences, as in 418, 370/69 and 362 BC.10 Moreover, the existence of Mantineia was important because the
security of its walls encouraged Mantineian autonomy in foreign policy and
the development of an independent democratic political system (Xen. Hell.
5.2.1-2, cf. Thuc. 5.29.1). It was after the Persian Wars, according to
Strabon (8.3.2), that both Mantineia and Tegea synoecised out of their
respective village settlements, and it is this event that can be linked with
the anti-Spartan movement that culminated in the battle of Tegea (Hdt. 9.35).
Conversely, when synoecism led to the adoption of a democratic
constitution, life in village settlements fostered oligarchic rule and thus
encouraged loyalty to Sparta’s own interests (Paus. 8.8.9, 10; Xen. Hell.
5.2.7; 6.4.18, cf. 5.3-5). Pausanias recalls (8.53.10) how the Tegeans once
beat the Spartans because of the bitter and unforgiving Arcadian weather conditions:
As it was snowing, they [the Spartans] were
chilled, and thus distressed by their armour ... [the Tegeans] untroubled by
the cold donned, they say, their armour, went out against the Lakedaimonians,
and had the better of the engagement. It is Arcadia’s
most famous son, Polybios, who writes (4.21.1) that the harshness of the
Arcadian character was the direct result of “the cold and gloomy atmospheric
conditions” that prevail in Arcadia. It has been argued that the pattern of
inter-annual climatic variability in ancient Greece was very similar to the
modern pattern.11 Today, the mountains and high plateaux of Arcadia have an alpine
climate in modified form, and so, as elsewhere (e.g. the Pindhos), the
altitude modifies the intense summer heat and lowers the winter temperatures
sufficiently for much of the precipitation to fall as snow. The seasonal
distribution of rainfall is transitional in type, and though summer is the season
of minimal rainfall the summer drought is not complete as in other parts of
Greece with showers a common occurrence. Heavy and continuous rain is
frequent in autumn and winter, while rainstorms break all year round on the
loftier ranges. When the redoubtable Colonel Leake rode through Arcadia he
made the following observation: There is, indeed, a great difference between the
maritime climate of the Peloponnesus and that of the Arcadian mountains. “E’
un’ aria troppo rigida” observed to me the Ragusan consul at Methoni,
speaking of the interior of the peninsula. The average climate of Arcadia is
in fact cooler, by several degrees, than that of the consul’s native town,
though the latter is situated so much farther north.12 In
general, the altitude of Arcadia and its enclosed
mountain setting result in annual mean temperatures as low as those of parts
of northern Greece.13 In particular, this low temperature affects the winter growing
season, especially if we consider that days of frost can easily extend into
the month of April.14 And so, in Thucydides’ catalogue of fertile regions, which
certainly included the Peloponnese (Thuc. 1.2.3, cf. Hdt. 7.102), Arcadia is
omitted. The human landscape It would
appear that Arcadia, with its wild, lofty
and bleak terrain, was a place to get away from. Nevertheless, not every
Arcadian was equally likely to become an emigrant, let alone a mercenary.
Mobility tends to be the last resort, with movement abroad frequently
signalling final abandonment of the old way of life for pastures new. Tegean
colonists, according to Arcadian tradition (Conon 26 FGrHist F 36;
Paus. 8.53.4), crossed over to Crete and founded the polis of Gortyn. Other
Arcadians, in this case of unspecified provenance, built a polis that
retained the ethnic of its founding fathers “Arcades”. This particular
settlement can be traced from the protogeometric period onwards.15 Herodotos mentions (7.90) that some of the inhabitants of Cyprus
originated from Arcadia. Other Arcadian overseas settlements from the period
of Greek colonisation, however, are not evident. Christian Callmer argues that a fifth-century BC
population explosion in Arcadia forced many Arcadians to become mercenaries
and this hypothesis could help explain why, unlike many other parts of the
Greek world, Arcadia had so few colonies.16 Of course, this particular population explosion does not coincide
with the period of colonisation, it occurs much later, yet there is evidence
to suggest Arcadian mercenaries were common even as early as the archaic
period if not earlier. Already, lord Agapenor, under the banner of Agamemnon,
had led to Troy his Arcadians who were, even in those most fabled and ancient
times, famed as excellent warriors (Il. B 611). Strabon, quoting
Ephoros of Kyme, says (5.2.4) that both Greeks and barbarians alike had
attested Arcadian martial skills since the very dawn of history. Earlier in
his work Strabon makes a general observation in which he claims that “the
cold mountainous regions [of Europe] furnished by nature only a wretched
existence to their inhabitants”. Strabon expands upon this observation and
makes the interesting comment that in the mountainous parts of Europe
“everything tends to make men warlike and courageous” (2.5.26). In other
words, the dearth of Arcadian colonies could best be explained by the
following hypothesis. Prior to the fifth century BC there already existed a
long tradition of Arcadians’ serving overseas as mercenaries. To these
generations of men, with a reputation as hardy warriors second to none,
mercenary service was a necessary response to Arcadia’s harsh physical
environment, which, like most rugged and mountainous lands, yielded little in
terms of human sustenance or material wealth. The ancient sources, unfortunately, give little
away with regards to the human landscape of Arcadia,
and what little they do give tends to be conflicting. One early fourth-century
BC decree (IG V2 3.1-2) provides evidence that in Arcadia
livestock formed a part of every farmer’s strategy, and here should be
mentioned the Arcadian coins that bear livestock motifs on their reverse
face.17 Alternatively, a late fourth-century BC decree (IG V2
3.6) deals with the restoration of Tegean exiles by Alexander III, many of
whom, incidentally, may have been mercenaries serving the Great King of
Persia. One of its provisions allows each repatriated Tegean a dwelling with
a garden (vegetable plot?). In his account of the siege of Mantineia, namely
that conducted by the Spartan king Agesipolis in the summer of 385 BC,
Xenophon (Hell. 5.2.4) makes reference to Mantineia’s grain supply,
which was in abundance owing to the bumper harvest of the previous year. In
his account of Second Mantineia, Xenophon remarks there were cattle grazing
and labourers toiling outside Mantineia’s walls. Whether or not these
labourers were hired or slave labour is not made clear, but Xenophon does say
(Hell. 7.5.14-15, cf. 6.5.15) that the entire population was out
working the fields. From Polybios (4.21.1) we learn explicitly that the
Arcadians worked the fields themselves; perhaps this is what Perikles was
referring to when he insultingly called the Peloponnesians “ones who work
their land themselves”, in other words poor farmers (Thuc. 1.141.3). Perhaps
there is evidence for a changing landscape, for in a late second century AD
source, Philostratos (VA 8.7.12), Arcadia is seen as a region of
grassland and forest. Equally, it is now populated with “a great many
labourers, many goat-herds and swine-herds, and shepherds and drivers either
for the oxen or the horses ... and wood-cutters, a craft to which they are
trained from boyhood”. Strabon (8.8.1) may have identified this
transformation some two hundred or so years earlier. It was then that the
geographer had confessed to his lack of knowledge of Arcadia because of “the
complete devastation of the country” through the recent civil wars, namely
those of the last years of the Roman Republic. In earlier days, he explains,
Arcadia had been noted for its cities, although the “tillers of the soil” had
disappeared with the foundation of Megalopolis. This phenomenon, if indeed he
is correct, might explain why Strabon saw many pastures for cattle, asses and
horses, the last being a “most excellent breed”.18 Varro (2.1.14; 7.1, cf. Plaut. Asin. 2.2.67; Pers. 3.9;
Plin. nat. 8.68), likewise, notes that Arcadia was famed for its
horses, adding that its mules and asses were especially esteemed. Although it is difficult to imagine what would
have been the state of the Arcadian landscape in antiquity, it seems highly
probable that Arcadian poleis and settlements were characterised by their
pastoral life, with a small amount of arable farming and perhaps some
hunting.19 It is particularly instructive to note the Arcadian bronze
statuettes of the archaic period representing peasant-farmers and shepherds.
A number of these are dressed in high felt hat or conical leather cap, short
embroidered cloak or tunic and a pair of stout walking boots. A few are armed
with hefty sticks or crooks. Some have discarded cloak, tunic and boots, but
not the hat, which was, and still is, a necessary protection against the
blistering summer sun. Others appear wrapped from head to foot in heavy
sheepskin cloak, pinned at the throat with a large pin — appropriate
protection against the hard Arcadian winters.20 In addition, there are a few that represent certain deities in the
likeness of Arcadian shepherds and Arcadian women. More important, perhaps,
are those statuettes burdened with animals: a ram tucked under an arm, a calf
laid across the shoulders, or a dead fox carried by its tail. Seventy-five per
cent of these statuettes were discovered in south-west Arcadia
around Mount Lykaios. A few came to light in the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaios
itself, but the bulk of them were unearthed at Berekla, the probable site of
a sanctuary to Pan as attested by Pausanias (8.38. 5).21 Two of the statuettes from this region were found in the sanctuary
of Pan at Melpea, near to the modern village of Andritsaina, and, unusually
for Arcadian bronzes, are inscribed. One, a shepherd in a conical felt hat
and fringed cloak with tassels, bears the inscription: “Dedicated to Pan by
Phauleas”. The second, a similar bronze shepherd, has the simple inscription:
“To Pan from Aineias”.22 Both Xenophon (An. 4.7.13; Hell. 7.3.1) and Pindar (Ol.
6.88) attest Aineias as an Arcadian name; it is particularly rare outside the
Peloponnese. Traditionally, Arcadia
was the favourite haunt of the pastoral god Pan, his birthplace being Mount
Mainalon (Paus. 8.36.8). The cult of Pan was especially strong throughout the
whole region: grottoes, springs, blasted trees and crags being particularly
sacred to him. Not only was Pan commonly represented on later Arcadian League
coins, but also the region abounded in sanctuaries and altars dedicated to
him.23 It appears, therefore, that the bronze statuettes were dedicated by
the Arcadians in their own likeness and left to stand, in the main, in a
shrine sacred to Pan, “lord of Arcadia” and guardian of flocks and herds.
However, although most of these bronzes represent Arcadian shepherds and
peasant-farmers, occasionally Hermes himself, god of flocks and herds, is
portrayed. Hermes, if not naked, is usually in typical Arcadian garb and
carries a ram, in which case he is only distinguishable from his worshippers
by his badge of office, the wings on his boots or on his cap.24 Hermes, again according to tradition, was also born in Arcadia,
either on Mount Kerkaios or on Mount Kyllene. At the former location the god
had two temples dedicated to him, and here he was respected as “the
ram-bearer” and “the foremost fighter”.25 As a final point here, Pausanias notes (8.42.11, cf. 37.1) that the
offerings from the Phigaleians to Demeter — Mount Elaios, hard by Phigaleia
in south-west Arcadia, has a cave sacred to the goddess — not only included
grapes, cultivated fruits and honeycombs, but also “raw wool still full of
its grease”. As already noted, in antiquity Arcadia
was noted for its many flocks and herds. Although ovicapines are less
efficient converters of plant matter into meat than pigs or cattle, they do
have valuable secondary uses. Herd management geared towards wool and milk
production is certainly implied in a comedy fragment by Antiphanes (fr. 21
Kassel-Austin). As Athenaios later says (9.375), here quoting an old law
according to Androtion, “they should not sacrifice a sheep that has not been
shorn, or that had not had a lamb”. Furthermore, sheep and goats are light
and mobile, and thus can certainly cope with steep and rough terrain as well
as thrive on poor pastures. Goats, in particular, can also exploit the
pasture further upland and thus be removed to higher elevations where natural
evergreen shrub vegetation has not been heavily grazed through the winter.
Sheep, on the other hand, produce an abundance of raw wool and this thick
oily fleece enables the animal to survive extremes of cold better than a
goat. Hesiod poetically talks (Op. 515-16) of “the keen Boreas” being
able to piece the coat of a goat but not the fleece of a sheep, and,
likewise, there is Aristotle’s remark (HA 610b33) that sheep survive
the cold better than goats. Additionally, sheep are efficient converters of
stubble, fallow and post-harvest vines into manure, and thus contributes
greatly to the maintenance of soil fertility. Xenophon, himself a farmer,
recommends (Oik. 20.10) that farmers ought to collect manure for use
as fertiliser. Finally, sheep and goats can also be readily fed, especially
in times of little pasturage, on straw, maize, green barley, barley seed,
(which increases milk yield quotas), dried vetch, oats, millet, almond husks,
carob, dried figs, and a wide array of household waste products and minor
surpluses. High in elevation and remote from the sea, the alpine climate of
Arcadia readily supports sheep and goats, which in turn provide its
inhabitants with wool, milk, butter and cheese. Farming strategies In
ancient Arcadia the right to pasture animals may have been limited to citizens
or those to whom a specific grant was made.26 If this argument is valid, however, there are sound reasons for
questioning the belief that the citizen-farmers of Arcadia practised
transhumance, in summer migrating to upland pastures with their flocks or
herds. Summer was the very time of year when their military services were
normally required on expedition or in defence of their polis. P.D.A.
Garnsey’s alternative model for their cultivation and herding would have
suited the poleis and settlements of Arcadia handsomely. Crop rotation would
have provided summer fodder, and livestock would then have provided manure as
well as consumed weeds.27 By employing this mini-mobile system of pastoralism ancient
subsistence farmers could have kept livestock on or near their land all year
round. Pausanias records (8.8.2) an Arcadian tradition concerning the birth of
Poseidon. Rhea saved the newly born Poseidon from being swallowed by Kronos
by hiding him among a flock of sheep pastured around a spring on the
Mantiniki. In fact, livestock is very much in evidence throughout the plain
to this day, with many flocks of sheep, each numbering some thirty to fifty
animals, as well as herds of goats higher up the slopes grazing upon the
maquis covering them. The maquis is not only an important resource for
grazing, but also for the collection of firewood and wild herbs: besides
vegetables and legumes, the local villagers eat a wide variety of “weeds” (chorta)
in the winter. In the villages themselves, the villagers tend to keep
free-range chickens and the occasional turkey around their dwellings. In
addition, a small number of pigs are housed in sheds and sties. The pigs are
generally butchered at Christmas, much of the meat being cooked with salt and
put into large storage jars between layers of rendered lard, thus providing
pork for consumption over the next six months or so. Of special interest,
although obviously not applicable to the ancient period, are the numerous
heaps of rotting orange pulp piled here and there, imported from the Argolid
and used as winter-feed for livestock. The Mantiniki itself is also given over to
arable farming with cereals predominating; especially wheat and maize or
Indian corn being cultivated in the wetter parts more suitable for summer
than winter crops. The maize is sown at the end of April and the beginning of
May in the Mantiniki, in other words when the inundated parts of the plain
are just clear of water. Unlike wheat, this quick growing grain copes well
with marshy soil and is ready to be reaped in September. Vegetables (spinach,
radishes, celery, garlic and chicory) occupy a much smaller but significant
area and substantial areas are given over to other annual crops such as
potatoes, cabbages and legumes (peas, chickpeas, lentils, kidney beans and
broad beans). All bar one of these vegetables and all the legumes are
recognisable both in archaeological finds and in classical texts, but as
there is a strong bias towards Athens, especially in the latter, it is
difficult to develop a picture of the commonly used foodstuffs of ancient
Arcadia. Hekataios of Miletos (FGrHist 1 F 9, cf. Harmodios FGrHist
319 F 1) regarded barley bread (mâza) and pork as the basis of
the Arcadian diet. Barley did better, and still does, in the dry and rocky
areas of central and southern Greece, hence the proverbial dictum “plant
wheat in mud, but barley plant in dust” (Plut. mor. 915e). So much
more reliable than wheat, barley has in all periods been crucial to food and
survival. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that maize, along with
tomatoes, potatoes and tobacco were completely alien to the ancient world.
English, French and Spanish adventurers not only plundered the New World of
gold and silver, but also brought back to early modern Europe tobacco and
other products such as maize and the potato. Ancient Arcadia also lacked the
olive tree, an actuality that should not be taken lightly considering the
central importance of the olive in the ancient Greek world — the chief source
of edible fat, of the best soap and of fuel for illumination. In contrast
with most areas of southern Greece the olive was, and still is, not grown in
Arcadia because of the high elevation and low temperatures.28 Yet, if we return to the agricultural cameo
painted by Xenophon in his account of Second Mantineia (Hell.
7.5.14-15), we can glean from it the following pieces of information. First
and foremost, Epameinondas attempts a coup de main against Mantineia
because, as it was harvest time, he reckoned that both its people and their
cattle would be outside the city walls. Second, when the Theban and
Thessalian cavalry arrive at Mantineia, they discover all the Mantineian
labourers and cattle outside the city walls. Third, there were many children
and older men from among the citizens of Mantineia who found themselves in
the same predicament. Points one and three are later re-endorsed by Xenophon
when he says (Hell. 7.5.17) that the timely intervention of the
Athenian cavalry saved for the Mantineians “everything that was outside the
walls”. Xenophon’s version of events raises a very
pertinent question; namely the actual whereabouts of the Mantineian hoplites
during Epameinondas’ lunge against their city. According to Aristotle (Pol.
1291a30, cf. Plut. Ages. 26.3-5) the peasant farmer was the backbone
of the citizen army. Since it was harvest time and the cattle were grazing
outside the city walls, it would be reasonable to assume that Mantineia’s
hoplites would be there also in their capacity as farmers, i.e. reaping grain
or tending to livestock (cf. Thuc. 4.88.1; Ain. Takt. 7.1). This, however,
may not have been the case. Earlier in his narrative, when dealing with the
initial stages of the campaign, Xenophon says (Hell. 7.5.7, 9) that
the anti-Theban alliance opted to gather its forces at Mantineia itself,
finally taking up “a strong position in the neighbourhood of Mantineia”.
Following Xenophon, therefore, it could be argued that the Mantineian
hoplites were in the immediate vicinity of their city, perhaps even involved
in the harvesting. Alternatively, if Diodoros’ account of the same campaign
is consulted, and perhaps here he is drawing upon Ephoros of Kyme, it is
evident that the Mantineian hoplites had left their city “in force to assist
the Lakedaimonians” (Diod. 15.84.1, cf. Xen. Hell. 7.5.14). The
arrival of the Mantineians in Lakonia, according to Diodoros, gave
Epameinondas an opportunity to outwit his enemies. Leaving his camp outside
Sparta intact, Epameinondas marched back to Tegea and “hurried to fall
suddenly on those left behind in Mantineia” (Diod. 15.84.1), i.e. Xenophon’s
labourers, old men and children busy with the harvest who, according to
Diodoros (15.84.2), never expected Epameinondas to swoop out of the blue.
Meanwhile, realising they had been fooled, the Spartans and Mantineians march
north for Arcadia, finally “making an appearance outside Mantineia” (Diod.
15.84.3). It seems the Mantineian harvest of 362 BC
was, despite the rude interruption, collected even though the majority of the
polis’ hoplites were on campaign and therefore absent. There is an old Maniote song, which vividly
describes the ability of women to gather the harvest while their men folk are
away at way,29 and modern anthropological studies have demonstrated that in times
of crisis the division of labour within a peasant household can enable male
members to leave home. H.A. Koster, for instance, studied a number of
subsistence farming households in the highlands of the Argolid, in the
north-east Peloponnese, and his work revealed that a heavy proportion of the
herding tasks fell to the household head’s spouse. Although this was due to
such factors as the ability of the household head as a ploughman, it does
show that women are capable of turning, at the very least, their hand to the
tending of flocks and herds. In the month of May, for example, the spouse in
Koster’s study worked no less than 387 hours with the sheep (fifty-two per
cent of the month), a key time for milk production as well as ploughing. The
following month the spouse was again with the flock, but this time with the
aid of her son for two weeks during his school holiday, while her husband was
grafting and planting new olives as well as sowing the summer crop of
irrigated potatoes. The spouse, now freed from the task of shepherding, then
assisted her daughter in the preparation of planting seed potatoes.
Throughout the year, incidentally, the daughter ran the house, i.e. making
beds, preparing the daily meals, cleaning, feeding and caring for the
household animals, mending and washing clothes, and baking bread.30 It should be noted here that pastoralism, in contrast to straight
arable farming, relies upon a much smaller work force and in many cases one
or two individuals are all that is needed to make a go of it. Interestingly,
literature throughout the ages is well stocked with references to the “lonely
shepherd” and Varro, for example, offers (rust. 2.2.20) the statistic
of one man per 100 rough-fleeced sheep in the Epeiros of his day.31 Generally, the anthropological studies indicate
that women’s tasks are undemanding in terms of brute strength, but they are
frequently tedious or involve bending over for long periods of time.
Nevertheless, women regularly do jobs that are considered the man’s preserve,
such as climb olive trees, ploughing and digging. When push comes to shove,
the women of the household can cope. Leake, on his travels through Arcadia,
had already seen this for himself: Here [Krathis] we meet no less than one hundred
women, each bearing on her back a great bundle of wood, equal to half a load
of an ass. In these, as well as many other mountainous parts of Greece,
agriculture and outdoor labour of every kind are added to the domestic duties
of women; the men, for the most part, being employed with their horses as
carriers, or tending the flocks, or residing abroad as artisans and traders.32 And
thus, on entering Arcadia via the southern Arcadian settlement of Eutaia
during the summer of 370 BC, the only inhabitants
Agesilaos finds were the old men and the women and children; the men of
military age had left the settlement in order to join the Arcadian forces
(Xen. Hell. 6.5.12). Survival strategies According
to Garnsey there was one crisis that was endemic in the Mediterranean world,
and that was the shortage of food. Harvest failure was the underlying cause
of food shortage, but wars, shortfalls in yields and endemic diseases all
played their calamitous part.33 Crop failure and the resultant poverty could drive communities to
emigrate in search of greener pastures. A seven-year drought apparently
forced the Therans to reduce their island’s population by establishing a
colony at Kyrene (Hdt. 4.151-3, cf. Pind. Pyth. 4.100). Truly, in all
its provisions, the foundation decree suits these circumstances: first,
compulsory enlistment; second, severe limitations on the right to return to
the mother-city; and third, fierce threats against defaulters (SEG
IX.3.28-37). In like manner, according to Strabon (6.1.6), the Chalkians from
Euboia participated in the foundation of Rhegion because of a failure of
crops. Again, an anecdote from Plutarch (mor. 773a-b) according to
which Archias’ foundation of Syracuse was the direct result of drought and
plague in Corinth. Finally, Thucydides postulates (1.15.1) that the
underlying cause of Greek colonisation was the need for land; cultivable land
is precious while bare rocks are so plentiful, and it is of the former that
he speaks.34 It must be stressed that if food crises were common in antiquity,
famine itself, on the other hand, was rare.34 As insurance against such calamities subsistence
farmers, in general, would have had a number of survival strategies.36 These strategies included diversification of crops (Theophr. HP
8.1.2),37 inter-cropping (Theophr. HP 8.3.5; 5.6; 6.1; CP
3.6.1), fragmentation of land (IG I3 421-30),38 storage (Xen. Hell. 5.2.4)39 and “sky-watching” (Xen. Oik. 17.12-13; Theophr. HP
8.1.4; 6.1). In the event of an actual crisis and his survival strategies
having been exhausted, the farmer would be forced to consider a number of
emergency options, some of them dire in the extreme. First, the household
diet could be eked out with “wild things” such as leafy plants, nuts and
berries (Theophr. HP 3, 7; CP 1-2; Athen. 2.50-8; Gal. 6.14;
15; 32; 38; 39, cf. Thuc. 3.111.1),40 but these foodstuffs are low in calorific content and soon vanish
if all and sundry are harvesting them. Coupled with this reliance upon
country vegetation, a hungry household could also hunt for small game and
fish. A more extreme measure would be that of asset stripping whereby a
household would either slaughter or sell off livestock. The Corinthians, for
example, resorted to living off their cattle when their city was threatened
by the Spartans in 390 BC (Xen. Hell. 4.5.1).
Into this category can also go the selling of valuable family land (Od.
L 488-91), and according to the rhetoric of Isokrates (Paneg. 168)
destitute bucolic families were roving overseas in vagabond bands looking for
a means to survive. Another desperate response to a crisis would have been
that which involved the removal of dependants from the embattled household.
One method was either to surrender the children to better off relatives (Lys.
3.6; Xen. Mem. 2.7.2) or to try to mortgage them ([Dem.] 59.18, cf.
Hdt. 8.105), a practice parodied by Aristophanes (Ach. 729-35) when he
has the bumpkin from Megara passing off his daughters as piglets in order to
sell them. To spare the innocent children, an adult male
could opt to leave the household and attempt to earn a wage, which would
hopefully secure the family’s fortune. Noteworthy are Varro’s perique
pauperculi (1.17.2), owner cultivators and small tenant farmers who were
forced by poverty to seek additional income and were free to do so because of
the rhythm of the farming year. In the late republic many of these preferred
to serve in the legions than till their land or work as seasonal labourers, and
this was especially so after Gaius Marius had opened up the army to the capite
censi. During the classical period, on the other hand, there was a ready
market for rowers, especially in the service of Athens’ busy imperial fleet.
In one of his forensic speeches, Demosthenes describes how an angry gang of
rowers confronted a ship’s captain who was short of cash and thus was unable
to pay them their wages, which they needed in order “to feed their families”
(50.11). Not satisfied with the pleas of the captain, the crew jumped ship en
masse, thereby leaving the Athenian master high and dry and without
rowers for his vessel. Nevertheless, after securing a loan through family
connections, he promptly hired a new crew on the spot (Dem. 50.18, cf. Isokr.
Paneg. 116). Admittedly, the relevance here with ancient Arcadia is
somewhat obscure, it being a landlocked region not noted for its hired
rowers.41 Arcadia was (and still is) a rugged and mountainous area, which,
coupled with its harsh physical environment, its land-locked isolation and
its lack of political unity, provided little in terms of human sustenance or
material wealth. Add to this combination of factors the ever present threat
of a food crisis, be it through the folly of man or the caprice of nature,
and there exists the potential scenario in which many an Arcadian subsistence
farmer and his household, struggling to survive at the best of times,
eventually went under. The anthropologist David Arnold grimly sums it up:
“Peasants, one of the most long-lived forms of human organisation known to
recorded history, seem always to walk a razor-thin line between survival and
extinction”.42 There was, as alluded to earlier, a traditional economic lifeline
for Arcadian households who walked the “razor-thin line between survival and
extinction”, and that was for one or more of their male members to serve
abroad as mercenaries. Mercenary service In
general, mercenary service would have worked in two ways. First, it provided
the opportunity for subsistence level households to rid themselves
temporarily of any excess male mouths to feed either because of poverty or
short-term lack of victuals. A fragment of Menander’s Xenologos (fr.
354 Kassel-Austin) merits note as it tells of a young man who seeks his
fortune as a mercenary in order to save his father from poverty. Often,
campaigning mercenaries had families to return to (Xen. An. 6.4.8)
provided of course, that they made the return trip (Xen. An. 7.1.36;
2.6; Diod. 16.63.5). Second, when face with dire poverty and imminent loss of
land or life, mercenary service presented a man with a full-time career. To
be more specific, the survival of the peasantry in ancient Arcadia depended
not only upon their success in following a low risk farming strategy, but
also upon their readiness to take up the mercenary calling when needs must.
And so, in the words of a popular fourth-century BC
proverb: “I’ll do as the Arcadians”, because the Arcadians fought as
mercenaries and won victories for others.43 Indeed, the expression “I’ll do as the Arcadians” was taken up by
the Attic comic poet, Plato (fr. 106 Kassel-Austin), in order to describe his
wretched life-style: A fighter born, a victory of mine own Here,
the poet claims that he survives in the manner of an Arcadian mercenary;
shackled by his poverty stricken existence “he provides others with comedies
he wrote himself”.44 The first Arcadian mercenaries mentioned in
surviving texts appear to be those who, after the battle of Thermopylai,
approached Xerxes and promptly offered him their services. This, however, was
not another case of Greeks medising, as did, for instance, the Thebans. On
the contrary, the motive that placed this small band of Arcadian hoplites
into the camp of the Persian king was purely financial and not political.
For, in the words of Herodotos (8.26), these were “poor men seeking
employment”. Earlier in his account covering Thermopylai, Herodotos says
(7.202) that 500 Tegeans, the same number of Mantineians, 120 Orchomenians
and 1000 hoplites “from the rest of Arcadia” were present during the initial
phases of the campaign. Later, when Herodotos covers the campaigning season
of the following year, he clearly states (9.28; 77, cf. 8.72) that 1500
Tegeans and 600 Orchomenians were present at Plataiai, the Mantineian
contingent arriving too late for the battle. Puzzlingly, Herodotos fails to
mention whether the 1000 other Arcadian hoplites present at Thermopylai
fought at Plataiai. Are these the Arcadians who offered to hire themselves
out to Xerxes? Earlier evidence only hints at the existence of
Arcadian mercenaries. According to Pausanias (8.39.4) the southern Arcadian settlement
of Oresthasion despatched “one hundred epikouroi” to aid the
Phigaleians in the attempt to liberate their settlement from the Spartans
during the Second Messenian War (ca 660-640 BC).
There are, unfortunately, a number of valid reasons why an argument that
viewed these Arcadians as mercenaries could be doubted. First, Pausanias does
not specifically call these soldiers mercenaries — on the contrary, he
describes them as “hand picked men” who had volunteered for the mission.
Second, he says (8.41.1) that in the agora of Phigaleia stood the tomb of the
“picked men of Oresthasion.” It seems the Phigaleians respected these
warriors as heroes, they having fallen to a man in the victorious battle
against the Spartans (Paus. 8.39.5). Last, but by no means least, is
Pausanias’ evidence here trustworthy? The “saga” of Aristomenes taints his
whole account. Needless to say, other evidence for Arcadian participation in
the Second Messenian War is just as nebulous. In the second year of their
struggle against Sparta the Messenians received some form of military
assistance from the Arcadians, as they did also from the Argives and the
Sikyonians. This does strongly suggest that all these Peloponnesian troops
stood alongside the Messenians at the so-called battle of “Boar’s Tomb” as
unpaid allies and not as hired mercenaries (Paus. 4.15.7). Much later in the
war the Arcadians joined forces with the Messenians at the engagement that
became known as the battle of the “Great Trench” (Paus. 4.17.2). Again, there
is no evidence to suggest that these Arcadians were mercenaries, and
Pausanias only offers (8.6.1) a bland statement concerning the Arcadian help
given to the Messenians “in their struggle against Lakedaimon”. Strabon, on
the other hand, makes a chance remark (362) concerning a poem by Tyrtaios in
which the Messenians are said to have taken “the Argives, Eleians, Pisatans,
and Arcadians as allies and revolted”. Neither the text of Pausanias nor the
extant fragments of his sources for this account actually use the noun epikouroi.
H.T. Wade-Gery, however, offers the quaint notion that the Phigaleians
donated the bronze cult statue of Apollo Epikourios from Bassai to
Oresthasion (Megalopolis’ predecessor: Paus. 8.27.3) for services rendered.45 Evidence of a less obscure nature for the
employment of Arcadian mercenaries during the archaic period comes from a
coin struck circa 514-510 BC by the powerful Athenian
Alkmeonidai clan. In 510 BC the Alkmeonidai launched a successful coup to
overthrow the Peisistratid tyrant, Hippias: according to Herodotos (5.62-5),
their effort had the military support of Sparta. On the basis of a triskeles
emblem assigned to an Alkmeonidai mint and the fact that one such coin was
unearthed in Arcadia, C.T. Seltman tentatively suggests that the clan also
employed Peloponnesian mercenaries in its bid for power. It goes without
saying that, if the clan really did employ mercenaries, they would have
included Arcadians in their ranks.46 From Herodotos it is known that the opposing Peisistratid faction
had often relied upon hired soldiery. Although Peisistratos began his long
career with a humble bodyguard of citizen club-bearers (Hdt. 1.59, cf. Arist.
Ath. Pol. 14.1), he had, after his second comeback from exile, begun
to surround himself in true tyrannical fashion with a more effective
bodyguard, i.e. one composed of mercenaries (Hdt. 1.64). With regards to the
possible employment of mercenaries by the Alkmeonidai, it is important to
take note of the later Athenian tradition that supported such a view.47 The historical record is somewhat more
substantial when dealing with Gelon, the aristocratic tyrant of Gela and
master of Syracuse. One of the acts of this ruler was to enlarge Syracuse by
transplanting to it the whole or part of the populations of other
Sicilian-Greek poleis. In addition he also enfranchised over 10,000 “foreign
mercenaries” who were in his pay (Diod. 11.73.3, cf. 11.28; Arist. Pol.
1304a6). Herodotos says (7.158) Gelon commanded an extremely large body of
hoplites, having offered, in exchange for the position of commander-in-chief,
20,000 of them to the Hellenic League in 480 BC.
Some of these, without doubt, were mercenary-hoplites and these would have
included Arcadians, for there is evidence to demonstrate that a number of
them became Gelon’s close-companions (hetairoi) and thus occupied
positions of trust within the tyrant’s Syracusan court. One of them is known
from an ode that Pindar dedicated to Gelon. This was Hagesias of Syracuse, a
victor in the Olympic mule-car race of 472 BC: he was formerly from the
Arcadian polis of Stymphalos (Pind. Ol. 6.80-4; 93-100). Although not
strictly a soldier, Hagesias was a military mantis who belonged to the
Iamidai, a priestly clan the members of which were found in all parts of
Greece. In the same clan, for example, was Tisamenos of Elis, a mantis who
extracted full-citizenship from the Spartans for his services (Hdt. 9.33-5).
We know of another Arcadian via a dedicatory offering from Olympia. Pausanias
(5.27.1) identifies this offering as belonging to a certain Phormis who had
“crossed to Sicily from Mainalos to serve Gelon ... distinguishing himself in
the campaigns of Gelon and afterwards of his brother Hieron”. Phormis of
Mainalos, through his martial services to these tyrants, had amassed a small
fortune and was thus able to make dedications not only at Olympia but also at
Delphi. Pausanias describes the Olympic offering as consisting of a statue
group composed of two horses and two charioteers, a charioteer standing by
the side of each of the horses. Dionysios of Argos and Simonides of Aigina
undertook these impressive works of art. On the flank of the first of the
horses ran the inscription: “Dedicated by Phormis, formerly of Arcadian
Mainalos, now of Syracuse”. Other offerings, according to Pausanias (5.27.7),
included three statues of Phormis in combat, dedicated by Lykortas of
Syracuse, an Arcadian comrade-in-arms perhaps (Polybios’ father, for
instance, was called Lykortas). Each bears an inscription saying the soldier
fighting is Phormis of Mainalos. Again an Olympic inscription, in this case
upon a stone statue base, verifies the existence of another Arcadian
soldier-of-fortune, this time from Mantineia, in the service of Gelon. Dated
by L.H. Jeffery to the first quarter of the fifth century BC the inscription
imparts that the donor was Praxiteles son of Krinios, who describes himself
as being of Syracuse and Kamarina, having migrated to Sicily from Mantineia
in “Arcadia of the many sheep”.48 Kamarina, according to Herodotos (7.156), was levelled by Gelon in
484 BC. Her citizens were subsequently settled in Syracuse to increase that
city’s population, and were to remain there until Kamarina was rebuilt ca
461 BC after the fall of the Deinomenids (Diod. 11.76.5). By at least the second half of the fifth century
BC, Arcadian mercenaries had become proverbial. From
the Attic poet Hermippos, for example, there is the satirical poem Phormophoroi,
a catalogue of the provenance of Athenian imports written ca 425 BC.
Although the work survives only in part there is the line “Phrygia sends us
servants; Arcadia soldiers for pay” (... A)PO\ D) *A)RKADI/AS E)PI/KOUROS: fr. 63.18
Kassel-Austin).49 And so, with his ill-fated Sicilian armada, Nikias took 250
Mantineians “and other mercenaries” (Thuc. 6.43.1, cf. 22.1). With the line
from Hermippos’ poem still in mind, it can be safely assumed that a fair
number of these other mercenaries were also from Arcadia. Later, in the same
theatre of operations, the Corinthians despatched a number of Arcadian
mercenaries, under a Corinthian general, to the aid of the besieged
Syracusans (Thuc. 7.19.4). Thucydides remarks (7.59.9) that both sides
employed Arcadian hoplites during the Sicilian campaign, stressing that the
Mantineians recruited by the Athenians “were accustomed to go against any who
at anytime were pointed out to them as enemies, and at this time were led by
the desire for gain [my italics] to regard as enemies the Arcadians
that were with the Corinthians”. Two very important inferences can be drawn
from Thucydides’ observations here. First, the implication is made that at
the time of the Sicilian campaign it was already customary for the Arcadians
to serve abroad as mercenaries. Second, in what can be recognised as a
hallmark of the true professional, the Arcadian mercenary fought purely for
gain regardless of whom he might find himself opposed to. Much like the English
mercenary-captain Sydnam Poyntz who, during the Thirty Years’ War, changed
sides more than once. Such an attitude is best illuminated upon by the
shrewdness of Sir James Turner, a Scot who fought for both Sweden and Denmark
during the 1630s and, like his contemporary Poyntz, left an interesting
account of his services abroad: That soe we serve our master honestlie, it is no
matter what master we serve; so without examination of the justice of the
quarrell, or regard of my duetie to either prince or countrey, I resolved to
goe with the ship I first recounterd.50 Here
lies the essence of the mercenary who has taken up soldiering as a way of
life to alleviate a definite lack of means. With the Ten Thousand Arcadians,
it seems, were leaving their homeland and making mercenary service a
permanent career. When the Arcadian general, Kleanor of Orchomenos, came to
command one of the contingents that made up the remnants of the Ten Thousand,
his force is described by Xenophon (An. 4.8.18) as the “Arcadian
hoplite force”. More enlightening is the later comment of Xenophon’s in which
he says (An. 6.2.10) that “the rest of the army amounted to nothing”
(in truth more than half the army did consist of Arcadians and Achaians).
Consequently, at Pontic Heraklea, we find all the Arcadians and Achaians —
over 4000 of them — separating from the remnants of the Ten Thousand and
marching off for a looting spree under ten newly elected generals with
collegiate powers (Xen. An. 6.2.12, 16).51 Scrutinising more closely the figures supplied by Xenophon in the Anabasis
reveals just how many Arcadians had signed up for this particular adventure.
To begin with, it is known, as Xenophon makes clear, that more than half of
the Ten Thousand were composed of Arcadians and Achaians. Furthermore, at
this stage of the campaign the rest of the army amounted to some 4140 men
(Xen. An. 6.2.16) and, therefore, the combined strengths of the
Arcadians and the Achaians would have stood in the order of 4200 hoplites
minimum. There is little reason to assume that any one
body of hoplites had suffered more than another body on the march until this
point. True, the Arcadians and Achaians lost heavily when they went it alone
(Xen. An. 6.3.4-9), but that was later. Therefore, the original number
of these mercenaries can be restored by applying the proportions given by
Xenophon (An. 6.2.16) to the original strength of the Ten Thousand. In
other words, 4200 Arcadian and Achaian hoplites to 3100 others (plus 100
peltasts and forty horsemen) when applied to the figure 10,400 (the original
hoplite strength) produces the approximate figure of 6000 Arcadians and
Achaians, thus leaving 4400 as the total for the others. Unfortunately,
Xenophon does not provide his readers with the relative proportions of the
Arcadian and Achaian hoplites, but some other considerations may help to
divide them. K.J. Beloch points out that the area of Achaia was about half
that of Arcadia,52 and from Diodoros (15.31.2) it is known that under the reform of
the Peloponnesian League forces in 377/6 BC, Achaia
contributed one unit while Arcadia contributed two. Beloch concludes by
offering the idea that the population of Achaia was about half that of
Arcadia, all very dubious but helpful nonetheless. This is especially so if
the number of named individuals from those regions, as given by Xenophon, is
taken into account: sixteen Arcadians and seven Achaians. This certainly does
bear out the two-to-one ratio of Arcadians to Achaians almost exactly.
Furthermore, Xenophon usually identifies Arcadians in particular not only as
such but also by their locality in Arcadia.53 More importantly, however, by applying the two-to-one ratio to the
total of 6000 given above, the tidy sum of 4000 Arcadians and 2000 Achaians
is arrived at. In other words, the Arcadians make up thirty-eight-and-half
per cent of the total hoplite strength of the Ten Thousand, a mercenary force
composed of no less than twenty-four different ethnic identities. Even if the
peltasts et al. are included, the Arcadians still make up thirty-one
per cent of the whole army. More revealing is the fact that the vast
majority of the 4000 Arcadians appear to have been drawn from the pool of
Peloponnesian hoplite-mercenaries under Cyrus’ own garrison commanders (Xen. An.
1.1.6; 2.1, 3). In other words, the Arcadians were already under contract
within the Persian empire before Cyrus the Younger attempted to overthrow his
elder brother, Artaxerxes II. It is known for certain that in 405 BC
300 hoplites formed Cyrus’ personal body-guard under the command of the
Arcadian, Xenias of Parrhasia (Xen. An. 1.1.2) and, according to one
of Artaxerxes’ court physicians, Ktesias of Knidos (FGrHist 688 F
15.52), it had been common practice for Arcadian hoplites to seek permanent
employment within the bounds of the empire during the Peloponnesian War. It
should be noted that Arcadia did not suffer devastation, as did Attica during
this war. J. Roy rightly argues that even before his bid for the throne,
Cyrus could rely upon no less than 10,000 hoplite-mercenaries who were
already in Asia Minor: the 4000 hoplites Cyrus lent to Aristippos of Larissa
for a campaign in Thessaly against the latter’s political rivals (Xen. An.
1.1.10); the 4000 Peloponnesian hoplites Xenias of Parrhasia brought to
Sardis (Xen. An. 1.2.3);54 the 300 hoplites Pasion the Megarian took to Miletos and then on to
Sardis (Xen. An. 1.2.3); and, lastly, the skeleton force of
Peloponnesian hoplites left to garrison the Ionian cities during Cyrus’ march
into the heartland of the empire (Xen. An. 1.2.1). In the words of J.
Roy, “mercenaries or potential mercenaries must have been numerous in Ionia”.55 Service with Persia Each
year, according to Xenophon (Oik. 4.6), the Persian king would review
his troops under arms and amongst those inspected were the empire’s hired
soldiery. Indeed, small bodies of Arcadians often acted as the bodyguard (DORU/FOROI,
i.e. “spear-bearers”) of the various imperial satraps during this period, if
not before. In the year 428 BC, for example, the satrap of
Sardis, Pissouthnes, despatched “mercenaries, both Arcadian and barbarian” to
aid one of the warring factions in Notion, and the name of their Arcadian
commander, Hippias, is also recorded (Thuc. 3.34.2-3).56 This family tradition of employing Arcadian hoplites — back in 440
BC Pissouthnes had lent a force of 700 mercenaries (Arcadians?) to the
anti-Athenian faction on Samos (Thuc. 1.115.4, cf. schol. Ar. Vesp.
283; Diod. 12.27.3; Plut. Per. 25.2-3) — was maintained by Pissouthnes’
bastard son, Amorges, the ally of Athens. For, in 412 BC, Amorges led a
revolt in Karia against his master, Dareios II, which was backed with the
experienced muscle of hoplite-mercenaries, many of whom were “from the
Peloponnese” (Thuc. 8.5.5). A late fifth-century BC document, known as the
Xanthian Stele, may be of use in further identifying these Peloponnesian
mercenaries. The document itself records the proud boast of a certain Lykian
dynast, [? Gerg]is the son of Harpagos, who claims to have slain, in a single
day, seven Arcadian hoplites who were in the pay of one of the Persian king’s
satraps.57 These unfortunate Arcadians may have been among the ranks of those
Peloponnesian mercenaries recruited by Amorges. Once Amorges’ rebellion had
been crushed and its leader hauled off to the Persian king in chains, his
mercenaries promptly found further employment in the enemy camp, i.e. with
the Peloponnesian forces in league with the loyal satrap, Tissaphernes.
Amorges’ mercenaries were immediately put under the command of a Spartiate,
Pedaritos, and detailed to garrison Chios (Thuc. 8.28.5; 32.2; 38.3; 55.3).
The reason for employing Amorges’ mercenaries, according to Thucydides (8.28.4),
was quite simple as “most of them were from the Peloponnese”. In other words,
it appears that Amorges’ mercenaries where Arcadians who had gone to the East
with the strict intention of staying there. To strengthen the argument that the Arcadians
were already holding imperial contracts prior to 401 BC,
there is the evidence from coins bearing the head of Pan, which have been
attributed to Cyrus the Younger. Roy argues that these coins cannot have been
struck during Cyrus’ advance into the empire’s heartland, since there would
not have been the time available to do so at Kaystrupedion, the only occasion
on which he paid the Greeks in his army (Xen. An. 1.2.11-12).58 If properly attributed to Cyrus these coins are earlier. In other
words, the coins were either struck as pay for his Arcadian hoplite garrisons
in Ionia, or as part of the bonus the prince handed out to the 300 hoplites
who escorted him to his father’s court in 405 BC (Xen. An. 1.4.12, cf.
1.2). Xenias of Parrhasia, their commander, had honourably served Cyrus for a
good number of years and had even put roots down in the empire. For, when he
finally deserted Cyrus’ cause at Myriandos — along with the Megarian general,
Pasion — his wife and children, as well as those of Pasion, were still in
Karia (Xen. An. 1.4.8). Mercenaries will occasionally adopt their
contract-country as their new home. In Egypt, for instance, there is a tomb
painting at Siwa, dated to the fifth century BC, which depicts a Greek who
took the name Si-Amun (“the man of Amun”). The Greek is shown with his son in
Egyptian pose but bearded, and with his son’s dress rendered in the Greek
manner.59 The list of names contained in the early sixth-century BC
inscription scratched by Greek mercenaries on the left leg of a colossal
statue of Rameses II at Abu Simbel suggests that at least one of them,
Psammetichos son of Theokles, was a second-or third-generation descendant of
an earlier Greek mercenary-cum-settler.60 These men were in the pay of the Saite pharaoh Psammetichos II, and
it is feasible that the father or grandfather of the Greek Psammetichos was
originally a mercenary who served the founder of the Sa‹te dynasty,
Psammetichos I, who, as Herodotos records (2.152), employed East Greek and
Karian hoplites. There is also Herodotos’ reference (3.26) to a group of
Samians who had settled, ca 525 BC, in the so-called “Isle of the
Blessed”: these men may have been veteran mercenaries who had finally opted
for a quite life. It should be stressed, at this juncture, that
Xenophon’s objective judgement on the reasons why men joined Cyrus’ adventure
was biased, especially when we consider that he needed to defend his own
dubious actions. Despite his obvious partiality, however, we should bear in
mind the one explicit analysis of the mercenaries’ motives he does offer (An.
6.4.8). From this passage the following salient points are evident. First,
Xenophon is speaking of mercenaries “who had sailed away from Greece”.
Second, these mercenaries had signed up “not because their means were
scanty”, indeed, some of them had “brought other men with them”, while others
“had even spent money” to do so. Third, once their contract with Cyrus had
expired, these men wanted to return “to Greece”. In other words, this passage
is clearly referring to the mercenaries who had come out from Greece, and not
those already serving the empire, namely the Arcadians (and Achaians) who
made up more than half of Cyrus’ hoplite force. Furthermore, these newcomers
were men of means, being either well-heeled Athenians like Xenophon himself,
or recruiting officers who had collected recruits from mainland Greece.61 In sum, this passage is no doubt true as regards part of Cyrus’
force, but only a small part. Xenophon has clearly opted to inflate the
social standing of his fellow mercenaries (cf. Isokr. Paneg. 146).
Indeed, the bulk of the Ten Thousand had already made the profession of
soldiering their permanent vocation. Five years later, the remnants of the
Ten Thousand are still active and serving under Agesilaos, who was then
campaigning in Ionia (Xen. Hell. 3.4.20). Later still, when the
Spartan king had left Ionia, their diminished ranks could still be counted
amongst his army at Second Koroneia where, like hard bitten professionals,
they rendered their paymaster sterling service (Xen. Hell. 4.3.15-18; Ages.
2.10-11). It should be noted that the majority of Agesilaos’ mercenaries had
actually wanted to remain in the east as opposed to returning to Greece (Xen.
Hell. 4.2.5). Curiously, Pausanias (8.6.2) makes reference to a group
of Arcadians who had crossed over to Ionia with Agesilaos in 396 BC,
and there is the mute possibility that these men regarded themselves as a
second generation of Cyreans en route to boost the now thinning ranks of the
“old guard”. Beyond the Persian empire In the
light of all this evidence, other areas outside the Persian empire in which
Arcadians could readily pick up mercenary contracts should now be considered.
One isolated field for employment was under the native tyrants of Tauric
Chersonese. Satyros I, king of the Cimmerian Bosporos ca 433-387 BC
(Lys. 16.4), employed a Greek, Sopaios, to command his army (Isokr. Trap.
3). It was the Stoic, Chrysippos of Soloi (fl. 230 BC) who once
asserted that if a wise man could not become a king then he should at least
seek employment as a soldier and “go campaigning with a king the kind
Idanthyros the Scythian was or Leukon of Pontus” (Plut. mor. 1043c-d,
cf. 1061d; Strab. 7.3.8; 4.4; Dio Chrys. or. 2.77). This advice, even
if post eventum, was obviously taken up by one group of Arcadian
mercenaries as is shown by the dedicatory inscription they set up to honour
Leukon, their wise employer.62 Satyros’ eldest son, Leukon was the powerful ruler of the kingdom
of the Cimmerian Bosporos ca 387-347 BC. Aineias Taktikos (5.2),
himself possibly an Arcadian and probably a mercenary for some part of his
life, laconically records that Leukon sacked those of his bodyguard who fell
into debt as a result of dice playing and further testimony to his canniness
can be found in Polyainos (6.9). A fitting parallel can be found in the 1542
garrison regulations for Berwick-upon-Tweed, which, quite naturally, expected
the worst from a soldier’s nature when he was idle. These regulations
prescribed penalties (varying from pay stoppages to terms of imprisonment and
death) for, amongst other misdemeanours, gambling for money rather than drink.
A brief mention should be made of Leukon’s not so wise grandson, Satyros II (fl.
330 BC), who came to inherit the Spartokid throne after a bloody power
struggle with his brothers. In Diodoros’ account (20.22.4; 23.6) both sides
appear to have relied heavily on hoplites- mercenaries, Satyros himself
employing no less than 2000 of them under the leadership of one Meniskos.
Satyros clung to power for a mere nine months, falling in a stubborn battle
in which Meniskos and his mercenary command played no small part (Diod.
20.23.6-8). Not all Arcadians, naturally, went east for
full-time employment and the subject of those who served the tyrants of
Sicily has already been touched upon. In 432 BC
the Corinthian general, Aristaios, was despatched north to the polis of
Poteidaia leading a force composed of fellow hoplite-citizen volunteers and
Peloponnesian hoplites whom he had “persuaded by pay” (Thuc. 1.60.1). Though
not identified as Arcadians by Thucydides, it is probable that these
particular mercenaries were either from Arcadia or, perhaps, Achaia. For when
contemporary ancient authors, especially Thucydides, describe
hoplite-mercenaries as “Peloponnesian” it is reasonable to assume the
mercenaries in question were Arcadian or Achaian.63 In Peloponnesian service full-time mercenaries would have been
useful on distant expeditions into the outer reaches of the Athenian empire,
especially when it is considered that the Peloponnesian citizen-hoplite, in
the main, was not much accustomed to face the discomforts and perils of long
campaigns. Thucydides (3.15.2) notes that Sparta’s Peloponnesian allies,
prior to the invasion of Attica set for the late summer of 428 BC, were slow
in mustering at the Isthmus as “they were busy with the harvesting their
crops and tired of military service”.64 Returning to the subject of the Peloponnesian mercenaries hired by
Corinth and subsequently despatched to Poteidaia, it is apparent that two
years later the Athenians had released them after their successful, albeit
protracted, siege of the city (Thuc. 2.70.3). The following year the same
mercenaries are to be found in the employ of the Chalkidians and fighting
alongside them at the battle of Spartolos (Thuc. 2.79.3). Five years after
that, when the Spartans conduct a campaign in far away Akarnania, the
Spartiate Eurylochos’ force included a contingent of Mantineian hoplites. It
is likely that these Mantineians were among a number of mercenaries hired by
Sparta specifically for this overseas adventure and, during a clash with the
Athenians and their local allies, demonstrated their professionalism by
keeping their hard pressed ranks as the rest of Eurylochos’ command
disintegrated around them (Thuc. 3.108.3). The justification for viewing the
Mantineians as hired soldiers is strengthened by a reference by Thucydides
(3.109.2) to Eurylochos’ force as “the miscellaneous crowd of mercenaries”.
More telling, perhaps, is the Mantineians willingness to go along with the
surviving Peloponnesian commanders in agreeing to desert their former allies
when granted unconditional leave to return home (Thuc. 3.109.2; 111.1-3).
This was not the first time that the Athenians had allowed mercenaries to go
scot-free for, as noted above, they did just that after the fall of
Poteidaia. It seems expedient for Athens to regard mercenaries as a necessary
evil and, as such, the commodity was worth protecting. She certainly employed
Arcadian hoplites at a later date. In conclusion The
pressures that drove Greeks to hawk themselves as mercenaries were manifold.
In the case of the Arcadians who, along with the Achaians, provided the
largest percentage of hoplite-mercenaries available for hire, the prime
reason was, without doubt, poverty. The evidence is more than sufficiently
confirmed by the number of Arcadians seeking a full-time livelihood in the
Persian empire. It is fashionable for scholars touching on this subject to
make a blanket claim that the root cause for the evident rise of mercenary
service during the fourth century BC was the poverty
brought about by the decline of the polis. There is abundant literary
evidence for this general explanation in the source material dealing with
this turbulent century. Take, for example, Diodoros’ account (20.40.6-7) of
Agathokles of Syracuse’s campaign against Carthage in 307 BC. Here the author
stresses that most of the Greek soldiery hoped to get rich by joining this
adventure, especially in view of the fact that Greece itself “had become poor
and miserable”. Again, by simply skimming through Isokrates’ polemic
pamphlets the reader will find the same argument (e.g. Paneg. 168; Phil.
97; Archid. 15.57-8).65 In the case of the Arcadians, however, who continued to make up the
majority of Greek mercenaries employed, the poverty of an area lacking
natural resources was always the main consideration. In his historical novel of the life of Cyrus the
Great of Persia, Xenophon relates how Cyrus reorganised his army into an
efficient fighting-machine. Amongst the soldiery recruited by him for this
purpose were men from Chaldaea. These Chaldaeans enjoyed serving as
mercenaries for a number of interrelated reasons: “they are fond of war and
poor of purse; for their country is mountainous and only a small part of it
is productive” (Xen. Cyr. 3.2.7, cf. 2.1.15; An. 4.3.4). The Cyropaedia
was written during Xenophon’s comfortable old age and one wonders if, when
looking back over his soldiering years within the ranks of the Ten Thousand,
Xenophon was also thinking of the many Arcadians mercenaries he encountered
there when he described the Chaldaeans. Lykomedes of Mantineia, in his speech, implies
that Arcadia, if she so wished, was now able to stand by herself (Xen. Hell.
7.1.23). This was no idle boast, for under his leadership the Arcadian League
had the backing of the Eparitoi, a recently commissioned body of 5000
hoplites, which was maintained and paid for by the League’s members (Xen. Hell.
7.4.22; Diod. 15.62.2; 67.2). It is highly probable that these professional
hoplites were recruited and selected from among the numerous Arcadian
mercenaries who had, until now, served in foreign armies. In other words,
Arcadian professionals were now utilising their martial skills in the
interests of the League instead of foreign paymasters. Initially, in order to
pay for this standing army a special coinage was struck by the League.66 By 363 BC, however, the Arcadian
leadership had been sadly reduced to plundering the sacred treasures of
Olympia in order to support them (Xen. Hell. 7.4.33). It was not long
before Arcadia’s first professional army dissolved. The ex-mercenaries simply
drifted back to their former mercenary careers as the coffers of the League
ran dry (Xen. Hell. 7.4.34, cf. 7.5.3), for, like the Chaldaeans,
these men were accustomed “to making their living through the business of
war” (Xen. Cyr. 3.2.25). Although the literary and epigraphical
evidence is lacking, this hypothesis accords with the Arcadian practice of
leaving their homeland to fight for others prior to the establishment of the
Arcadian League. To close this paper, it would be particularly instructive to
compare the fate of the Eparitoi with the rise of the Free Companies
after the shattering defeat of the French at Poitiers in 1356. In his lengthy
reminiscences to Froissart, the Bascot de Mauléon touches upon the
fate of the paid soldiery of both sides after peace was finally declared
between France and England. As a result of the cessation of active
hostilities “large numbers of poor companions trained in war came out [of the
forts and castles they once held] and collected together”. He continues,
explaining that “though the kings had made peace, they had to live somehow”.67 Composed of English, Welsh and Gascons released after Poitiers by
the Black Prince, as was customarily in order to avoid further payment to
soldiers, they had acquired in the prince’s campaigns a taste the ease and
riches of plunder. Along with German mercenaries, Hainault adventurers, and
French knights ruined by the ransoms of Poitiers, they were soon to gather in
armed bands of twenty to fifty around a professional captain. Each man had no
option other than to turn away from peace and grasp the proffered mercenary contract.
Bibliography
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